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This article examines ‘migration debates’ in Europe as mediated political rituals. It 
argues that the consistent meta-commentary within such debates-never regarded 
as sufficiently ‘open’ or ‘honest’ – can be taken as a starting point for exploring 
the simultaneous trace and disavowal of race and racializing discourses in public 
debate. It examines the disjuncture between the normative expectations of 
democratic deliberation and decision-making present in migration debates, and the 
ways in which migration stands for the transformation of the political conditions 
on which such normative eexpectations depend. Under these conditions, ‘debate’ 
must be approached as having ritual forms of value, and these forms of value are 
explored in a case study of a short-lived ‘burka debate’ in Ireland in late 2011.
Introduction: Never Ending, Never Open
The ‘migration debate’ is an established political ritual in Western Europe, and, to 
generalize somewhat in introduction, it is regularly characterized by the expression 
of frustration. Whenever a debate on migration is called for, or instigated, there is 
always a dominant sense in which it is never held to be open, or honest, or ‘mature’ 
enough. Always ongoing, but never open, at best these debates are evaluated by 
their protagonists as preludes to a better, truer form, foreshadowing the more open, 
more honest debate that is required, next time. This next time is never far away; 
perhaps in response to a news story, or a public incident, or an elite utterance or 
widely publicized piece of research about migrant and minority lives, a politician 
or public figure will call for a debate about migration. Such a call is frequently 
accompanied by a form of meta-commentary, that is, a concomitant evaluation of 
the quality of the public discourse required. Yet the debate inevitably falls short of 
this threshold of openness and honesty even as it unfurls, and this lack poses the 
question - how can this recurrent frustration be accounted for? How is it that under 
conditions of communicative abundance, public discourse on migration is held to 
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be structured by a communicative lack, or worse, by a series of communicative 
prohibitions? 
A recent illustration is employed to unfold dimensions of this recurrent frustration. 
Writing in The Guardian in June 2010, the Labour leadership candidate Ed Balls 
linked the failure of his party in the previous month’s general election to, in part, its 
failure to ‘be honest’ with the electorate on immigration. In an article entitled ‘We 
were wrong to allow so many eastern Europeans into Britain’, Balls argued that 
freedom of movement in the post-2004 accession EU had driven down wages,1 
and that ‘as Labour seeks to rebuild trust with the British people, it is important 
we are honest about what we got wrong’ (Balls, 2010). Referring to resentment in 
‘communities ill-prepared to deal with the reality of globalization’, and to the threat of 
the British National Party and Conservative Party stoking anti-immigrant and anti-
Europe sentiments for political gain, Balls argued that the Labour Party needed to 
concede that its ‘arguments on immigration were not good enough’ (ibid.). 
In part, Balls’ article was designed to distance himself from his political mentor, 
the former Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who had been caught unawares by a 
television camera, during an election campaign walkabout, describing a member 
of the public – Gillian Duffy, ‘a Rochdale pensioner, on her way for a loaf of bread’ - 
as ‘bigoted.’ This ephemeral image was sufficient to create an opportunity to attack 
Brown as ‘elitist’ and ‘soft’ on migration, an image that Balls, in turn, instrumentalised 
in his unsuccessful strategy of ‘winning back the trust’ of the British electorate. 
However, what became known as ‘Bigotgate’ occurred less than two months after 
a key policy speech by Gordon Brown in late March 2010, where he delivered a 
message on migration that far exceeded the political scope specified by Balls. 
Speaking directly to an imagined, migrant audience, Brown warned that ‘To those 
migrants who think they can get away without making a contribution, without 
respecting our way of life, without honouring the values that make Britain what it is 
– I have only one message: you are not welcome’ (Brown concluded with a caution 
that the debate on migration that should now proceed from his statement should be 
conducted ‘responsibly’). While Brown’s statement was not uncontroversial, it was 
also hailed as an important instance of ‘open language’, where ‘…the Labour party 
no longer equates concerns about immigration with out-and-out racism’ (Collard 
2010). 
1  A factual claim challenged in a subsequent article by Tim Finch, head of migration at the 
Institute for Public Research, see Anushka Asthana, ‘Ed Balls: Labour’s immigration policy hurt 
wages of British workers’, The Observer, Sunday 6 June 2010. Finch’s view was confirmed by a 
report issued by the Home Office in early 2012, see Dustmann et al (2012). For a media discussion 
of this report and contemporary counter-claims, see Williams (2012).
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This prevalent expression of frustrated openness begets a critical counter-
frustration. Writing about the politics of honesty concerning migration during the 
2010 UK General Election, The Guardian journalist Gary Younge commented: 
There can be no meaningful debate about immigration in Britain (or anywhere else 
that does not address neoliberal globalization, trade policy, development aid, colonial 
legacy, the European social fund, the dependency ratio and the low paid. But that is not 
the debate we have been having. Indeed, it is not a debate we have ever had. It’s not 
accusations of racism that are stopping the conversation, but racism itself. For if there 
is a liberal elite out there thwarting discussion on immigration, it is doing a very bad 
job. The tabloids and middle market papers seem to talk about little else, and whenever 
they play their inflammatory tunes the politicians duly dance’ (Younge, 2010). 
In his dialectical insistence on the absence of political economy and the politics 
of race in migration and integration debates, Younge’s assessment recalls a 
profoundly useful set of analytical observations from an earlier era. The ‘immigrant’, 
as Étienne Balibar noted, functions as a contested sociological category, but also 
as a malleable political and racial construct in public discourse. Concomitantly, 
‘migration debates’ are not restricted to an analysis of human movement, and its 
political-economic impacts, causes and human testimonies. Such rituals are also 
always ‘integration debates’, recurring evaluations of the presence and legitimacy of 
those who continue to occupy the racio-political construct of the migrant, a category 
understood by Balibar as including ‘not all foreigners, and not only foreigners.’ This 
suggestive political definition is drawn from Balibar and Wallerstein’s (1991) Race, 
Nation, Class, and specifically from a discussion of what is termed ‘crisis racism’, 
that is, the political production of race as a focus of anxiety, one that provides 
political capital in the form of ‘effective thinking upon an illusory object’, and that is 
produced through political spectacle. The invocation of crisis, in their understanding, 
provides a license for particular forms of speech, and ultimately political action, 
through the ‘…crossing of certain thresholds of intolerance […] which are generally 
turned on the victims themselves and described as thresholds of tolerance’ (1991: 
219, italics in original). 
Balibar’s description of this strategic inversion supports Younge’s insistence on 
the continuing political struggle over what is recognized as racism. His assessment 
suggests that the latent frustration of migration debates is as much a recognition 
of limits than an evaluation of limitations; what if that which cannot be said openly, 
is also that which, it is recognized, should not be said, but demands to be, in some 
way, in some code, in some shape? Thus while the Labour adviser Tim Collard 
(2010), writing in The Daily Telegraph, saw Brown’s ‘stirring words’ concerning 
those ‘not welcome’ as a salutary restoration of linguistic and political clarity beyond 
the ‘accusation’ of racism, Younge’s argument suggests that it is precisely through 
speech acts that claim a form of honesty that transcends racism, that the ‘motility’ 
of racist discourse is extended (see Stoler 1997). 
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It is this sense of a perpetual lack, of migration and integration debates as realms 
of discourse in which the truth is held to be regularly obscured or compromised, 
that is explored in this essay. It sets out key dimensions, or a tentative anatomy, of 
the political ritual of ‘migration debates’ in western Europe, and does so through 
heuristic exploration, theoretical development, and by unfolding the ritual nature 
of migration debates through an extended, contextualized example. Within this 
tentative framework, it argues that by examining migration debates as spectacular 
rituals that take place under particular political conditions, the apparent paradox 
of calls for openness compounding forms of exclusion can be explored. Further, it 
suggests that paying attention to this ritual is crucial in a conjuncture that displays 
many of the characteristics of ‘crisis racism’, expressed through a political repertoire 
which is also transnationally derived, and legitimated. 
Normative Traces, Ritual Frustrations
In advance of these explorations, however, the idea of public debate on migration 
as a spectacular ‘ritual’ requires careful substantiation. This frustrated commitment 
to the openness of debate recalls an intrinsic dimension of liberal democracy, 
whether figured through the idea of civic political participation; the role of the 
mass media as agents of the public interest and system-level plurality; or the near-
emancipatory properties frequently attached to ‘new media’ networks and modes 
of communicative participation (Jenkins & Thorburn 2004). In other words, this 
articulation of debate recalls an imaginary of the public sphere, or at least processes 
of rational deliberation and democratic action. Further, it does so within the context 
of nation-states, where the democratic public sphere functions normatively as 
a historical space of increasing integration, integrating individuals to a national 
society within a sovereign territory, and to what Ghorashi, Eriksen and Alghasi 
term an imagined ‘…isomorphism between individuals and the nation-state’ (2009: 
5). As they contend:
Immigrants seem to challenge this isomorphism within a number of arenas in today’s 
nation-states. In the field of politics, the increasing number of migrants may stand as 
a threat to state’s sovereignty, and has been an important issue in political debates. 
This possible threat is also felt in terms of the cultural positioning of the European self 
towards the newcomer, a positioning in which the European self is differentiated from 
the newcomer’s culture and way of being. As a possible threat in the socio-cultural 
and political context, the newcomers and their participation in various arenas within 
these societies are particularly under attention and focus; in education, in media 
representation, in the labour market, in relation to state bureaucracy and so on, there is 
a overwhelming tendency to regulate and form the coexistence of those originally who 
belong to here, and those who have battled their ways into the Western world (2009: 6)
Social Cohesion, Securitization and Counter-terrorism
50
While immigrants seem to challenge this ‘isomorphism’, the call to debate 
invokes putatively isomorphic structures, and imaginaries, in order to progress 
towards a political solution to the challenge – of too many migrants, of too many 
migrants of the wrong kind, or of too much ‘challenge’ of the wrong kind. It is in this 
tension that frustration resides, and this section provides a discursive examination 
of this tension by focusing on the normative assumptions inherent in the ‘call’ - 
that public debate facilitates political agency, and that debate on migration informs 
political decision-making on migration. Is it possible that the ‘lack’ in migration 
debates is not simply, or not at all, a question of discursive limitation and a lack of 
political honesty, and more a reflection of deeper, structural ‘lacks’? This section 
assembles a series of theoretical perspectives on this question, and deploys them 
to open out the suggestive metaphor of ‘isomorphism’ as a way of thinking about the 
drive, and frustration, of debate. On the basis of these readings, it moves towards a 
counter-reading of migration debates as spectacular rituals. 
Debate that Speaks without Hearing?
The act of calling for debate - and the meta-commentary on the ideal scope 
of debate - rely on a presumption of the agency of public deliberation and the 
responsiveness of democratic procedure, articulated under conditions that would 
appear to undermine belief in such ideal-type conditions or processes. As Peter 
Dahlgren (2009) outlines in his assessment of ‘democracy in difficult times’, the 
media, and mediated communication, are a prerequisite for shaping the democratic 
character of society, however both the media landscape and ‘…many of the social, 
cultural, political and technological conditions for democracy are in transition, and 
we have to incorporate these realities into our understanding of what democracy 
can and should be’ (2009: 14). 
In effect, Dahlgren’s challenge to ‘incorporate’ the realities of media industries, 
networked communications and the increasingly complex transformations of 
democratic systems towards versions of what Colin Crouch (2004) calls ‘post-
democracy’ is a central problematic of media sociology. In other words, despite 
widespread recognition of the shifting yet implacable inequalities of communicative 
power (Castells 2009); the ‘distortions’ that stem from corporate domination, 
economies of scale and the commodification of information as a public good 
(Freedman 2008); the paradigmatic importance of news and image management, 
public relations and ‘spin’ to political communication (Louw, 2010); the rhizomatic 
connectivities and networks that traverse and reshape the socio-cultural spaces 
of geopolitical territories (Appadurai 2006) - visions of the public sphere as an 
ideal space, or pedagogical aspiration for rational and reasoned communication, 
continue to resonate. 
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Definitions, of various kinds, descend from Jürgen Habermas’s contested 
historical reconstruction of the bourgeois public sphere as ‘a domain of our social 
life where such a thing as public opinion can be formed where citizens…deal with 
matters of general interest without being subject to coercion…’ (1997: 105). In a 
contemporary update, Alan McKee describes it as ‘…the virtual space where citizens 
of a country exchange ideas and discuss issues, in order to reach agreement about 
‘matters of general interest’…it’s where each of us finds out what’s happening in our 
community and what social, cultural and political issues are facing us. It’s where we 
engage with these issues and add our voices to discussions’ (2005:4-5). Dahlgren, 
in an earlier publication, sets it out as a realm ‘where information, ideas and debate 
can circulate in society, and where political opinion can be formed’ (1995: ix). 
In the scholarly literature, Habermas’ delineation of the public sphere, its 
normative implications and historical transformation have been subject to 
numerous critical assessments: of its gendered foundations and lack of attention 
to social movements and ‘counter public spheres’; its formal abstraction from 
embodied and social contexts of dialogue and struggle (Roberts 2004); its implicit 
acceptance of the ‘bleached weave of first world philosophy’ (Mills 1997) and the 
broadly governmentalist contention that ‘the public operates as an element of 
media discourse in that it presents a form of representation that contributes to the 
exercise and regulation of power’ (Higgins, 2008:1). Nevertheless, and abstracted 
from the context of Habermas’ encompassing project on communicative action and 
deliberative democracy (Hesmondalgh & Toynbee 2009), it is consistently read as 
a normative category against which the political conduct of media and the texture 
of public discourse can be assessed (Higgins 2008). 
Of more importance to this argument is the ways in which this aspirational force 
and guiding imaginary retains significance as a template for how public debate is 
explained from within. Peter Singer, for example, in a critique of George W Bush’s 
appeals to religious reason in presidential speeches that broach questions of 
bioethics, human sexuality and reproductive rights, appeals to a rarified vision of 
the liberal ethos of the ‘Founding Fathers’ to argue that while belief is not excluded 
from the ‘realm of public reason’, those who speak from a position of religious faith 
should be prepared to restate their arguments in terms that can appeal to those 
who do not share their system of belief:
Judging that better decisions emerge from open discussion, they (authors of the 
constitution) created public arenas, like town meetings and the two chambers of 
Congress, so that political debates could help to build an educated and informed 
citizenry, and an effective democracy. They did not want adherents of one religion, 
no matter how large a majority they might be, to impose their beliefs on the remainder 
(2004: 102).
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Singer’s argument is scarcely unaware of the transformative impacts of 
contemporary communicative conditions. Rather, this historical trajectory is granted 
a metaphorical power, laying the basis for a normative vision of public conduct and 
communicative ethics for participating in a democratic process whereby politics is 
‘…a kind of public conversation about issues of common concern, with a decision-
procedure for reaching temporary closure on these issues when the time for action 
has come’ (ibid). This conversation is normatively one of citizens progressing, or 
attempting to progress, towards a consensus on matters of general interest, and 
in so doing guaranteeing the functional health of democracy, as ‘it is the public 
sphere which helps keep all other elements of the edifice of democracy in place’ 
(Jakubowicz 1998: 16). 
As against this, there is a strong theoretical contention that the normative traces 
that sustain this idea of public debate depend on expressive and representative 
fallacies - that media mediate public opinion, and that public opinion, once 
represented, informs political representation. Two theoretical positions must 
suffice, in this context, to unravel these fallacies. Different national contexts have 
significantly different histories and structures of political communication (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004). Nevertheless, as Nick Couldry (2010) argues, there is a general 
argument to be made that the ‘close practical symbiosis of media and politics’ 
damages politics as a ‘distinctive space of deliberation’. Drawing on Thomas 
Meyer’s (2001) critique of how media has colonized politics ‘at the production 
level’, Couldry argues that the different time-cycles and temporal requirements of 
news production and cycles of political decision-making have merged, yet ‘…in 
principle, politics – the complex balancing of multiple persons, groups and ends – 
requires an “extended time horizon” whereas both the technological capacities and 
the economic dynamics of media tend towards an ever-accelerated cycle of news 
production and the exchange of news as a commodity’ (2010: 83). 
Within the parameters of a limited exposition, it is useful to examine these 
structuring fallacies through the heuristic critique offered by Jodi Dean in Democracy 
and Other Neoliberal Fantasies (2009). Reflecting on the global protests, on 
February 15th 2003, against the Iraq invasion, Dean characterizes the debate on 
the ethics and legality of war as one conducted in a ‘democracy that speaks without 
listening’, where 
Bush acknowledged…the fact that a message was out there: the protestors had a right 
to express their opinions. He didn’t actually respond to their message, however. He 
didn’t treat the words and actions of the protests as sending a message to him that he 
was in some ways obliged to answer. Rather, he acknowledged the existence of views 
different from his own’ (2009: 20)
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Dean’s argument is interesting because it does not depend on introducing 
material and symbolic distortion into an ideal image of communicative action and 
democratic participation. Rather, and taking its cue from the latent romanticism that 
continues to accompany assessments of the ‘digital revolution’ (Jenkins & Thorburn 
2004:9) the argument amplifies the ideal to a state of implosion. ‘Communicative 
abundance’, and the intensive, incessant circulation of opinion, comment and 
information elides the conditions for political debate as it ‘occludes the antagonism 
necessary for politics’ by splintering political energy into continuous, compressed 
sequences of (minor) issues and events. Thus, ‘the terabytes of commentary and 
information, then, did not indicate a debate over the war. On the contrary, in the 
days and weeks prior to the US invasion of Iraq, the antiwar messages morphed 
into so much circulating content…’ (2009: 21, italics added). 
Dean uses this global event to elaborate on how what she terms ‘politics 
circulating as content’ is increasingly divorced from ‘official politics’, that is, extensive 
opportunities for debate, from the operation of power in putatively democratic 
structures, as the density of content facilitated by new communications structures 
relieves political actors from ‘the obligation to answer embedded in the notion of 
a message’ (ibid). In referencing the reciprocal aspect of the message, Dean is 
drawing specifically on the communicative rationality of the Habermasian tradition, 
but also on the broader normative assumptions internal to the conduct of public 
debate. In this formulation, openness is a condition frustrated less by limitation 
than by its absence, as the value of a message is inversely related to the openness 
of mediated flow. Thus Dean reverses the constitutive terms of communicative 
action:
Communication in communicative capitalism, then, is not, as Jürgen Habermas would 
suggest, action oriented towards reaching understanding. In Habermas’s model of 
communicative action, the use value of a message depends on its orientation. A sender 
sends a message with the intention that message be received and understood. Any 
acceptance or rejection of the message depends on this understanding. Understanding 
is thus a necessary part of the communicative exchange. In communicative capitalism, 
however, the use value of a message is less important than its exchange value, its 
contribution to a larger pool, flow, or circulation of content. A contribution need not be 
understood; it need only be repeated, reproduced, forwarded. Circulation is the setting 
for the acceptance or rejection of a contribution (2009: 27)
Participating in ‘debate’, under these conditions, may be primarily affective, 
a structure of feeling rather than a structure of political agency. Evidently, this 
theorization requires grounded, contextual investigation, and it may be insufficiently 
sensitive to the limited, tactical and consciously ephemeral strategies wrought by 
‘alternative media’, for example, in and through these conditions (see Lievrouw 
2011). Nevertheless, it does support a move towards a fuller understanding of 
why ‘migration debates’, in particular, are better understood as ritual events in 
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contexts of communicative abundance, but also where other important isomorphic 
assumptions are disturbed.2 Dean’s framework raises the question; over and 
above the content that circulates in debates on migration, what is the message of 
‘migration debates’? 
Debate about Migration, Debating through Migration. 
If, as Ghorashi, Eriksen and Alghasi (2009) contend, ‘immigrants seem to 
challenge… isomorphism within a number of arenas in today’s nation-states’, 
it is a challenge that is suffused in a cultural and political vocabulary that is 
always at once descriptive and prescriptive (Welsch 1999). In Shohat and 
Stam’s assessment, the idea of multiculturalism in migration societies insists on 
a ‘constitutive heterogeneity’ (2003: 3) that refuses flattening out to foundational, 
isomorphic constructions of a national ethnos. However, the converse to this also 
holds. The prefix alone underpins the pronounced sense of multiculturalism as an 
imposition, as an unwelcome amendment to a pre-existing monoculturalism, and 
thus ‘ ... the very idea of multiculturalism, the ideology, disturbs out of proportion to 
what in fact it may be’ (Elliot and Lemert 2006: 137). Similarly, while ‘diversity’ has 
emerged as an imaginary for the management of difference beyond what is held to 
be the essentialist trap of ‘multiculturalism’, ‘talk of diversity’, as Mary Hickman has 
argued, may be ‘…predicated not on the acceptance of plurality but on the notion 
of a host who is being subject to diversification’ (2007: 12). 
What Hickman, in particular, identifies is a double movement in contemporary 
public imaginaries of difference governance in the nation-state, towards, on the 
one hand, a recognition or valuing of human diversity in certain ways and under 
certain conditions, while at the same time emphasizing that its acceptance remains 
contingent, and on ‘it’ continuing to be recognized as a good. This contingency 
becomes a subject of debate when particular dimensions of isomorphism are held 
to be disturbed; culture as a guarantee of cohesion, homogeneity as the basis 
for solidarity in the welfare state, shared values as a condition for public life. The 
contingency of migrants, the lack they come to represent, is most obvious in how 
Western European integration politics is mediated through idioms conveying 
threatened and desired states of integration: a recalibrated laïcité in France, 
‘community cohesion’ in the UK, ‘standards and values’ in the Netherlands, 
‘Leitkultur’ in Germany (Fekete 2009: 62-3). It is in these insistent, isomorphic 
2 Similarly, while the idea of open debate suggests a fidelity, in some way, to the emergence of a 
truth, or, at the very least, to establishing the empirical facts of a situation, it is evident from a huge 
body of research that the facts of migration and migrant lives are not only subject to dedicated forms 
of spin and racial distortion, but that debates on migration are hostage to what de Certeau (1986) 
calls recited truths, social facts produced and made factual through their circulation. For a hugely 
useful discussion of the uses of statistics and empirical claims in reporting and public debate, see 
Finney and Simpson (2009)
Titley
55
imaginaries, articulated at the start of the twenty-first century, that the second 
major normative ‘lack’ that haunts debate, is manifest. 
As William Walters (2004) notes, the image of a coherent national economic 
and political system, ‘…linked in turn to a social order…in an international order 
populated by discrete, bounded socio-economic systems’ retains significant 
purchase. It does so in much the same way as the normative tug of the public 
sphere, concomitant with the knowledge that the nation-state is now configured in a 
space of flows, where the ‘business’ of governance involves identifying and tapping 
productive flows and mobile goods, while, in a porous order, defending ‘insecure 
societies’ from bad flows, including such human mobilities as the ‘unskilled’ migrant 
worker, and the resource-drain of asylum-seeking (2004: 244). In other words, 
under conditions of neoliberal globalization and transnational connectivity, this set 
of isomorphic assumptions is subject to severe forms of stress. For this reason, 
as Arjun Appadurai argues, migrants and minorities may function as conduits for 
framing and exercising socio-political stresses in ways that recall, but extend, 
Balibar’s reading of the instrumentalities of ‘crisis racism’: 
Minorities…are the flashpoint for a series of uncertainties that mediate between 
everyday life and its fast shifting global backdrop. They create uncertainties about the 
national self and national citizenship because of their mixed status […] their movements 
threaten the policing of borders […] their lifestyles are easy ways to displace widespread 
tensions in society, particularly in urban society. Their politics tends to be multi-focal, 
so they are always sources of anxiety to security states. (2006: 44-5). 
The ‘needed but unwelcome’, in Appadurai’s argument, come to mediate an 
‘anxiety of incompleteness’, the impossibility of isomorphic coherence. In terms of 
the themes of this special issue, this is where the ‘securitization’ agenda is at its 
most acute, particularly in a context where ‘migrants’ are held to embody multiple 
forms of threat (McGhee 2008). The lack within this process of mediation, however, 
is that implicit in this dynamic of concentrating and dissipating anxiety is ultimately 
the recognition that migrants provide screens for projection that inevitably prove 
to be translucent. In other words, a plausible reading of the frustrated openness 
of debate is that it fixes the migrant as the embodiment of broader disjuncture, 
but cannot fully reduce them to it. As Bill Jordan and Franck Duvell (2003) argue, 
a political focus on immigration cannot indefinitely exclude the wider backdrop of 
isomorphic disturbance, as:
“immigration” comes to be a term that connotes all the unresolved issues of membership 
in present-day societies. It mobilizes the resentment of those made insecure by their 
vulnerabilities to global competition; it taps into rivalries between excluded groups; it 
links the fate of immobile and impoverished ethnic minority communities with the threat 
of mobile and resourceful newcomers, seen as further subverting the protections of 
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citizenship. It allows the politics of nationalism and ‘race’ to be rekindled, and exposes 
the fragility of liberal democratic institutions (2003: 62). 
Thus while migration policy, in the realm of labour market regulation, is profoundly 
unresponsive to public opinion, attempts to resolve issues of membership through 
political initiatives on migration are noticeably responsive. As Bryan Fanning 
argues, ‘…the primary goal of any viable integration project should be to close gaps 
between “nationals” and “non-nationals” for the sake of future social cohesion (2009: 
3). However, in Western Europe, integration projects are structured around the gap 
between the discursive and the material: integration politics involves extensive, 
formal and symbolic demands for loyalty and elective homogeneity in public space, 
while integration regimes organize presence and access to socio-economic rights 
through stratified systems of entry, status, residence and legitimacy (Kofman 2004, 
Titley 2012). 
In a recent survey of compulsory integration modalities in Europe, Guild, 
Groenendijk and Carrera (2009) draw attention to the transfer of ‘civic mandatory 
integration’ from a process of access to national citizenship through naturalisation 
to integration as the mode of discipline. Highlighting the privatised ‘pre-migration’ 
integration test pioneered by the Netherlands and adapted by several other 
countries, they argue that integration has become a border practice, beyond and 
inside the territorial border, merging entrepreneurial desires for economic utility 
with managerial concerns regarding cultural compatibility and socio-economic 
footprints:
In the context of immigration law, integration becomes a tool to control the non-national 
‘inside’ the nation-state and even ‘abroad’... Integration functions as another regulatory 
technique for the state to manage access by the non-national – not to the status of citizen 
– but to the act of entry, the security of residence, family reunification and protection 
against expulsion... Integration determines the ‘legality’ or ‘illegality’ of human mobility, 
and constitutes another frontier to being considered as a ‘legal immigrant’ (2009: 16)
This analysis pinpoints how even the prospective migrant can be subjectivised 
according to cohering notions derived from idealised, isomorphic projections of 
the national citizen, without prospect of the formal subjecthood and legal status 
of such citizenship. The apparent contradiction between expansive demands for 
affective and symbolic integration and structured stratification can be resolved 
with reference to James Tully’s discussion of subjectification (2002). Tully gives 
the example of what he terms citizenization to argue that practices of governance 
are also practices of subjectification, in that they create not only subjects classified 
and organised by legal status, but also through the development of habituated, 
‘practical identities’ over time. Neither determining nor over-determined, the field of 
citizenisation involves ‘...the diverse kind of relational subjectivity one internalizes 
and negotiates through participation over time, with their range of possible 
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conduct and individual variation’ (2002: 539–40). In regulating and organising the 
productive contribution of migrant labour and the manifold risks associated with 
migrants as ‘disturbances’, integration governance seeks to make access to formal 
status dependent on engagement with, or satisfactory adoption of, the ‘practical 
identity’. It produces differentiated and flexible modes of legal subjectification, while 
delineating acceptable ranges of possible conduct (McGhee 2008) and desirable 
subject-positions. As the next section discusses, these forms of identification, of 
those that embody ‘lack’ attempting to narrow the gap, are demanded for display 
in public space, and through public ritual. That is, ‘debate’ can be read also a 
technology of subjectification, in its dual sense of constituting and oppressing. In 
advance of that, a contextual discussion illustrates how shifting media dynamics 
and the recuperative nationalist formations prevalent under neoliberalism come 
together in the ritual of ‘debate’. 
Migration Debates as Political Rituals: the Australian Example
It is this compensatory dimension of political spectacle that Ghassan Hage captures 
where he argues that ‘migration debates’ are not meant to inform government, but 
are instead technologies of governance. In his 1998 book White Nation: Fantasies 
of Supremacy in a Multicultural Society, Hage sets out a lucid and also highly 
particular, contextual reading of multicultural backlash in Australia in the early years 
of the John Howard government, and at the height of Pauline Hanson and her One 
Nation party’s popularity. In this book, and also in his 2003’s Paranoid Nationalism: 
Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society, Hage examines the expression of 
racialised anxieties in terms – that presage Appadurai’s (2006) critique - of what he 
sees as the accumulating isomorphic disjunctures of neoliberalism. The neoliberal 
transfer of care from society to capital involves a kind of trauma – for the national 
and nationalist citizen it involves a dawning realisation that the motherland nolonger 
cares to nurture, and for the white citizen it involves some level of reckoning with 
the relative dilution of racial privilege in a globalising political-economy. As a 
consequence, racialised anxiety involves a form of transference: if the motherland 
will not nurture, the strong fatherland must secure the borders and with it the 
previous state of settled affairs (an arrangement that Williams (2004), discussed 
above, terms domopolitics). If whiteness is nolonger privileged, it is thus as a result 
of reverse discrimination (hence multicultural backlash), and must also be recouped 
through forms of public fantasy.
It is here that the ‘migration debate’ has a role as a technology of subjectification. 
Hage’s argument is formed in a context where the media field in Australia also 
underwent significant changes. The success of Howardism was to blend ‘economic 
fundamentalism, assimilationist social agendas, the steady privatisation of capital 
and risk, and nostalgic politics’ (Greenfield and Williams, 2001:32). Central to the 
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promotion of a compensatory cultural nationalism was a crusade against ‘political 
correctness’, that is, against artificial impositions on projected, if undefined, states 
of free speech and open debate. Such a structuring trope provides productive 
affinities for a deregulating media field searching for competitive advantages with 
regard to an increasingly fragmented audience. As Guy Rundle documents:
The rise of such figures (Howard, Hanson) was accompanied by shifts with(in?) the 
media and popular culture. The Fairfax press, once carrying a range of crusading 
left-liberal voices, became bland lifestyle progressivist papers, oriented to advertising. 
Rupert Murdoch’s News Limited papers, no longer needing to curry favour with a Labor 
government, moved decisively to the centre-right. Commercial radio was developing a 
new generation of shock jocks, and they occupied an even-larger slice of the schedule. 
..The new shockjocks, and a new style of Right-wing columnist – typified by the rise of 
Andrew Bolt in the Herald Sun – began to channel the political style of US ‘culture war’ 
politics, in which the Left were constructed as civilizational wreckers, and immigration 
and multiculturalism held as politics of national destruction (Rundle 2011). 
In a study of what he terms ‘Media governmentality, Howardism and the Hanson 
effect’, David Nolan (2003) is sympathetic to an argument such as Rundle’s, which 
locates the affinity with nationalist populism within the profit motive and political 
opportunism of the commercial media. Nolan also argues that there is a need 
to move beyond approaches that may become analytically limited by a ‘media-
society’ dichotomy that encourages either a moralistic critique of journalistic 
agency, or a sublimation of this agency to determining professional and industrial 
structures. It is more useful, Nolan argues, to see journalists as ‘social actors that 
exercise an agency whose scope may be seen as circumscribed by sociopolitical, 
organizational and discursive structures rather than determined by them (2003: 
1369, italics in original).
Nolan’s theorisation is aimed at understanding how journalists, and journalistic 
practices critical of Howardism and Hansonism, neverthless operated within their 
hegemonic parameters. Journalism’s professional commitment to represent the 
public involves a constantly negotiated relationship with ‘the public’, imagined 
and produced in part through these professional practices. As Nolan documents, 
the constant political representation of Hanson’s politics as representative of the 
ordinary person presents a dilemma for this expressive commitment, particularly 
when the interests of the ‘ordinary person’ are produced in a ‘culture war’ logic, 
and through opposition with the interests and expertise of ‘elites’ (a category 
which is easily extended to include journalists). Thus while many journalists were 
politically unsettled by these developments in Australian politics, the framework of 
representative affinity nevertheless created the conditions for the amplification of 
Hanson’s profile and Howard’s discursive ploy:
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Indeed, while she continued to be represented as both a political extremist and a 
problematic individual, journalists came to see Hanson as exactly what she claimed 
to be: a genuine ‘representative of the people’. The centrality of Howard’s personal 
role in this process cannot be underestimated for, as Prime Minister, he constitutes a 
key reference point for the definition of what constitutes acceptable public discourse. 
Howard not only positioned Hanson’s speech as a representation of the sentiments of 
‘ordinary Australians’ and the removal of “the pall of censorship on certain issues”, but 
also contested the suggestion that Hanson’s views could not reasonably be labelled 
racist… Howard’s suggestion was that politically correct elites had ‘got it wrong’ 
because racism was self-evidently immoral and the people could, for this reason, not be 
considered racist. This ultimately led to established understandings of what constitutes 
racism themselves being undermined. Nowhere was this clearer than where Hanson’s 
statements themselves were used as the basis for opinion polls… Such polls worked to 
provide political legitimacy for proposals such as ‘reducing Asian immigration’ simply 
by presenting them as serious options for which respondents could reasonably grant 
or refuse support. At the same time, poll results served to provide further support to 
Hanson’s claims to ‘represent the people’ (2003: 1374).
In this spiral, then, ‘views seen previously as regressively racist’ were increasingly 
circulated as approaching the status of common sense, and in need of debate 
given the manifest evidence of opinion polls, and the dangers of being seen to 
‘censor’ the frustrations of ordinary people. It is here that Ghassan Hage’s analysis 
of ritual is of importance. As he notes, the frequency of public debates on the need 
to control immigration, and to undo what had ‘gone too far’, stood in stark contrast 
to the global-labour integrationism of federal government policy (1998: 241). Given 
this disconnect between hegemonic discourse and government practice, migration 
debates provided a cultural form capable of containing and exploiting these 
contradictions. As he points out, given that such debates do precisely the opposite 
of what the lingering normative sense of debate suggests, they should be read as 
anthropological ritual rather than as democratic process. 
Approached beyond the expressive fallacy of media practice, and the 
representative fallacy of normative democratic assumptions, they can be read as a 
form of what Hage terms ‘white governmental buzz’: ‘rituals of white empowerment’ 
that simulate an affective sense of privileged governmental belonging; that restore 
a felt sense of control over their destiny and the nation; and that allow the presence 
and lives of migrants to be defined as a white problem inviting majority deliberation 
on the solutions (1998: 240–243). It is here that Hage’s argument recalls that of 
Balibar on crisis racism:
Immigration debates and opinion polls are an invitation to judge those who have already 
immigrated, as well as those who are about to immigrate. Not only is this facilitated 
through the use of the word ‘migrant’, whose meaning slides freely between the two 
categories, but also, and inescapably, to pronounce a judgement on the value of 
migration is to pronounce a judgement on the value of the contribution of existing Third-
World looking Australians to the country’s development. It is in the conditions created 
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by all these discursive effects that a White immigration speak flourishes – a language 
operating in itself as a technology of problematisation and marginalisation: ‘they should 
come’, and ‘they shouldn’t’, ‘they have contributed’ and ‘they haven’t’, ‘there are too 
many’ and ‘there aren’t enough’ [...] it is on such fertile ground that the White Nation 
fantasy seasonally rejuvenates itself and tried to keep the multicultural real at bay. In 
this sense, the immigration debate became the main form in which the dialectic of 
inclusion and exclusion was ritualised and institutionalised in Australia (ibid: 242)
Hage’s work is powerfully suggestive, but as an explicitly anthropological reading, 
it can be no more than that when it comes to interpreting other contexts. What it 
provides is an set of analytical possibilities for examining what unfolds in the call for 
debate; the legitimate speaking positions and forms of speech that are prescribed, 
and the need to read ‘frustrated openness’ against the political conditions that it 
simultaneously identifies and disavows. However, as the next section identifies, 
the unfolding of debate now takes place in an irreducibly transnational space, and 
the ‘governmental buzz’ of debate now encompasses a repertoire of integration 
events. The concluding section of this essay takes the theoretical possibilities 
discussed in this section to analyse a recent, and banal, iteration of a ‘migration 
debate’ in Ireland. 
Reading the Burka Debate
During the slow news days of August 2011, a city councillor in Cork, the Republic 
of Ireland’s second largest city, proposed a motion to ban burkas, and to give 
police the powers to order young people to remove the hoods of their hooded tops. 
Implicitly activating febrile associations of race with class by relating this call to 
the ‘lessons’ of the riots in London in July 2011, Joe O’Callaghan contended that 
Ireland should follow France and Belgium in legislating for bans because ‘it is an 
affront to women to have to be covered from head to toe in a shroud in this day and 
age. I do not think it is compatible with our modern society and it also gives rise to 
security issues’ (O’Riordain, 2011). Quoted further in The Irish Times, O’Callaghan 
continued to deploy metaphors somewhat at odds with his concern for equality, 
but also defined a very particular speaking position from which to call for a debate: 
“Wearing a burka is an affront to women in this day and age and this view has been 
endorsed by one of our local Muslim leaders in Cork. I fail to accept that anyone with 
any cop-on would like to wrap themselves in what looks like a curtain all day,” Mr 
O’Callaghan said…“I knew this would cause controversy but I live in a free country and 
if I have an opinion I will express it. I’m doing it now because I feel now is the time to 
address this issue, not in five years’ time,” he said. The councillor said burkas, along 
with balaclavas and hoodies, have become unacceptable in public places for reasons 




The ephemeral unfolding of this story is of interest to this argument. Following the 
publication of the story online and in the morning edition of The Irish Examiner (daily 
circulation 50,000 approx) on 19 August, the popular online news site thejournal.
ie published a summary of the story, accompanied by an online poll which asked, 
‘what do you think? (a) I think that the burqa should be banned in Ireland (b) I 
oppose a ban: women should be allowed to wear the burqa (c) I don’t agree with the 
burqa but I think a ban is wrong.’3 The poll resulted in 137 comments and significant 
sharing through social media, as well as, presumably, page impressions and thus 
increased ‘hit rates’ of some commercial value. However, as the first comment 
under the poll – ‘can we have the option why is The Journal giving attention to an ill-
informed idiot of a councillor’ – indicates, the status of the poll came in for serious 
questioning on social media platforms, echoing the critique made by Nolan of how 
opinion polls and debate threads confer political legitimacy through normalizing 
‘calls’ as political options inherently deserving of serious consideration. Thus, on 
the afternoon of the same day, thejournal.ie published a supplementary article 
entitled ‘Islam Ireland welcomes debate on burqa but government has no plan for 
ban.’4 The article presented the ‘results’ of the online poll as newsworthy statistics, 
and sourced a reaction from a spokesperson from the Islamic Cultural Centre, who 
‘welcomed’ the debate, and argued that ‘the covering of the face is not a religious 
requirement. It’s not an obligation and that has been verified by the Imam of the 
Islamic Cultural Centre in Ireland, Hussein Halawa, who is the most senior Islamic 
figure in Ireland’ (O’Connell 2011). Several radio features and further articles 
followed until, like a butterfly at the end of summer, the story folded its wings and 
vanished. 
While, in a radio interview, O’Callaghan pointed to the problem of ‘hundreds of 
thousands of people floating around in burkas’ in the UK, at no point was any specific 
instance of burka-wearing in Ireland identified, and it is far from clear if any burka-
wearing women reside in the country. However, as Hannah Arendt has pointed 
out, the presence of Jews has never been a pre-condition for anti-Semitism, and 
the presence of burka-wearers is similarly dispensable in the calling for debate. 
The lack a social referent – without essentialising the potential presence of such 
a referent as a locus of legitimacy – suggests that this event must be approached 
in terms of its mediation. Moreover, this fixation on the burka, and the banal and 
ephemeral nature of the event, suggests that this incident can be read generically, 
as saying something about the wider anatomy of ‘migration debates’ that have 
come to be structured around the identification of such ‘challenges’. In the following 
short sub-sections I propose a reading of this ‘call’ that draws out the traces and 
3 The poll can be accessed here: http://www.thejournal.ie/poll-do-you-agree-with-banning-the-
burqa-205093-Aug2011/
4 http://www.thejournal.ie/islam-ireland-welcomes-debate-on-burqa-but-government-has-
no-plans-for-ban-205302-Aug2011/ Note that the photo accompanying the article is of a woman 
wearing a niqab, not a burka. 
Social Cohesion, Securitization and Counter-terrorism
62
influences of the genre of debates that have come to the foreground of western 
European politics, over at least the last decade. 
The Burka as a Mobile Object of Aversion 
Given its relative or total absence from society in Ireland, how did the burka become 
the subject of this pressing call to debate, and one which, yet again, demanded a 
preemption of a ‘lack’, or frustrated openness (for as O’Callaghan warned, he has 
an opinion, and controversy will not deter him)? What Ghassan Hage terms the 
‘dialectic of inclusion and exclusion,’ as a majoritarian ritual, has increasingly come 
to be wrought in and through a transnational repertoire of aversion. As Carole Stabile 
and Deepa Kumar have shown, the burka has long operated as a colonial trope, 
and became a central image in the celebration of the ‘liberation’ of Afghanistan, 
with what George W Bush described as ‘women of cover’ featuring consistently 
on the cover of news magazines during 2001 (2005). However, and despite ‘burka’ 
controversies and head-covering controversies of various kinds spiking across the 
West over the last decade, it is likely that the specific political capital of the burka in 
this event stems from its insistent circulation in the aftermath of the French ‘Grand 
debate on national identity’ inaugurated by President Nicholas Sarkozy and Interior 
Minister Eric Besson from November 2 2009 to February 2 2010. The debate – 
featuring a moderated website with numerous debate threads and 350 ‘townhall 
meetings’ - focused on two questions: ‘what does it mean to be French today?’ And 
‘what has immigration contributed to France?’ 
What is interesting about the French debate is that while some, but not all, 
on the French left condemned it as a distraction from upcoming elections and as 
an artificial attempt to stimulate national unity through exclusion, there was no 
real attempt to obscure this political calculation. In other words, Ghassan Hage’s 
analysis of ‘governmental buzz’ was explicitly manifest in the mediated, political 
logic, where the debate was proposed as a chance to re-animate national identity 
in a context where it is under pressure from immigration, regionalism, and what 
Eric Besson termed ‘accelerated globalization’. Following the UMP’s poor electoral 
performance in March 2010, Sarkozy returned to the embers of the debate and 
argued that its findings made clear that the French people wanted a ban on the 
burka, regardless of its potential unconstitutionality. As the blogger and journalist 
Richard Seymour remarked pointedly:
There is only one reason for this: it is the only policy which the majority of French 
people support which Sarkozy could realistically deliver. He fully intends to press 
ahead with his policy of attacking the welfare state, cutting public sectors and raising 
the retirement age. As he’s in the business of inflicting pain, all he can offer is to inflict 
slightly more of it on France’s large Muslim minority (Seymour 2010) 
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Beyond the specificity of this political assessment, what is of significance here 
is the move from debate to a specific form of action, a move that represents an 
intensification of what Emmanuel Terray described, in discussing the 2004 headscarf 
law in France, as ‘doffing one’s cap in passing’. Terray understood the impetus for 
the Stasi commission and the subsequent ban in state schools as stemming from 
public and political anxiety about socio-cultural exclusion, and gender equality. 
The problem, he argued, is that in the absence of political will and transformative 
possibilities, the headscarf functioned totemically, as a ‘fictive problem that can 
be solved in terms of discourse and symbols’. The headscarf invokes structural 
issues at stake in the political context, but they are then bracketed off and political 
action returns to the substitute, that is, the convergence of anxieties on the bodies 
and identities of the young women of the ‘dis-integrated’ banlieues. Coming as a 
‘brutal affront to national amour-propre’, and ‘powerless before problems that it has 
not the energy to master, its narcissism wounded, its self-image under assault: 
confronted with such difficulties, the hysterical community will substitute a fictive 
problem that can be solved purely in terms of discourse and symbols (2004). 
The burka ban, which passed in final stage through the French national assembly 
in June 2011, has a mobilizing drive of a particular intensity in a country where there 
is such a ‘tight fit between nation and state – culture and institutions’ (Berezin 2009: 
245). Further, what Eric Fassin (2010) terms the ‘defence of sexual democracy’ has 
emerged as a mode of legitimate racialization, whereby the gendered figure of the 
emancipated subject is claimed as a national virtue, a fully achieved, enlightened 
dimension of an isomorphism threatened by regressive particularity (2010). For all 
its contextuality in relation to the shifting intersection between race and laïcité – not 
to mention the substantive feminist debates that the burka engenders – the burka 
debate has a generic dimension, mediating the resistant, isomorphic boundaries 
of the nation through symbolic action, and through the identification of problematic 
populations that require integration through spectacular action. 
This summary of recent French developments is necessary to underline that it 
was not just the transnationally legitimated object of aversion that the Cork councillor 
was attempting to translate into a social context, but also this genre of symbolic 
action. In fact, this genre can be examined further by proposing two broad sub-
genres: spectacles of cultural prohibition (burka debates, headscarves, minaret 
and mosque construction controversies) and spectacles of cultural precondition 
(integration tests, citizenship tests and ceremony, the prescription of ‘extreme’ 
opinion, and so forth). Symbolic action proposes a problem, as Terray noted, at 
the level of discourse and symbolism, and proposes to solve it through restoring a 
mediated relation between deliberation (debate) and political action (prohibition or 
precondition). This genre of symbolic action, in effect, formalizes the identification 
of minorities as ‘flashpoints’, which, as Appadurai contends in an extension of this 
argument, engenders an ‘emerging repertoire of efforts to produce previously 
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unrequired levels of certainty about social identity, values, survival and dignity’ 
(2006:7). 
However, it is far from clear as to what forms of ‘stability’ a legitimized aversion 
to the burka sustains. In his justifications, Joe O Callaghan cited gender equality, 
and ‘security, and common sense’ as arguments for seeking a ban. Whether by 
accident or design, this triple justification maps onto the prime trajectories of 
aversion that the burka symbolically animates. In these animating processes, the 
burka functions symbolically as a recursive sign, consistently indexed to a vision 
of an almost-achieved form of integration. As Eleonore Kofman summarizes, in 
western Europe, immigration politics focuses on ‘…selecting those who will be most 
advantageous to the economy, will fit into a pre-existing national culture, and not 
disrupt a supposed social and community cohesion’ (2005: 463). Yet what Kofman 
terms ‘neo-integrationist agendas’ are expressed through - profoundly overlapping 
and inter-related – paradigms that attempt to set isomorphic certainties through a 
symbolic rejection of signs such as the ‘burka’. The burka may be an alien practice 
to a ‘national culture’, or it may disturb a ‘national culture’ which is increasingly 
defined in terms of its liberal values and institutions, an achievement which 
requires a turn to what Phil Triadafilopoulos (2011) terms Schmittian liberalism: 
the sharp differentiation of ‘friends and enemies’ based on the assertion of non-
negotiable, core liberal values, and which may require protection through coercive 
state measures (prohibitions and preconditions). 
Further, this trajectory overlaps with what Lentin & Titley (2011) discuss as 
neoliberal racism, that is, the division of ‘diversity’ into ‘good diversity’ and ‘bad 
diversity’, where bad diversity is configured as unproductive, potentially conflictual, 
lacking autonomy, and a willfulness defined by adherence to the collective, 
a putative refusal not just of the subjectivity of the liberal individual, but also of 
‘individualization’. As a Danish politician tellingly commented during a short-lived 
burka debate in 2009: ‘If one is at the labour’ markets disposal, then one needs to 
send a signal that one wishes to enter the labour market, and one does not do that 
if one is covered and wearing a burka’ (Lentin & Titley, 2011: 243). The appeal, in 
Cork, to a cipher which animates this field of response and reaction suggests that, 
in this debate, it was more important that a ‘call’ produces a unifying spectacle 
predicated on restoring isomorphic certainties, rather than proposing any one 
settled, coherent imaginary. 
Debating Dis-integrated Futures
The call to debate the burka was mediated by a particular, racialized reading of the 
London riots of 2011, but also by a highly particular, positional reaction; that Ireland 
still has time to address these ‘challenges’, but that time is running out. This anxious 
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gaze to instructive elsewheres illustrates the ways in which ‘migration debates’ are 
increasingly transnationally networked and derived. In a recent comparative study 
of multicultural governance in six countries, Augie Fleras (2009) draws attention 
to the impact of international discourses in ‘hardening European arteries’ towards 
multiculturalism, immigration and Muslim populations (2009: 194–202). More 
specifically, Vertovec and Wessendorf have demonstrated how highly stylised 
rejections of ‘multiculturalism’ across Europe draw on a coherent repertoire of 
‘crisis idioms’. Widely recited, they construct multiculturalism as a single doctrine 
that has fostered separateness, stifled debate, refused common values and denied 
problems, while facilitating reprehensible cultural practices and providing a fecund 
habitat for terrorists (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009: 13–19). 
As they argue, ‘since the early 2000s across Europe, the rise, ubiquity, 
simultaneity and convergence of arguments condemning multiculturalism has 
been striking’ (ibid: 7). The rehearsal of idioms is frequently organized around 
a litany of events that are narrated in a temporal sequence that may take on a 
causal dimension through recitation. They compile a list of events of varying 
transnational significance, from Paul Schaffer’s article ‘The multicultural drama’ 
in The Netherlands in 2000, to the riots in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001; 
11 September 2001 in New York and Washington; the murders of Pim Fortuyn 
and Theo Van Gogh in The Netherlands in 2002 and 2004; David Goodhart’s 
article ‘Too Diverse?’ in Prospect magazine (2004); the Madrid bombing in 2004; 
the Jyllands Posten cartoon ‘controversy’ and extended aftermath through late 
2005/6; the émeutes in Paris in 2005; and the October 2006 Lancashire Telegraph 
article where Jack Straw discussed his discomfort in dealing with veiled female 
constituents. 
As a reading of recent history, Vertovec and Wessendorf rightly argue that 
these ‘portrayals… are demonstrably partial, erroneous, or false’ (ibid). However, 
identifying a lack of empirical veracity does not address the mediated nature and 
political significance of these narratives and ‘recited truths’ (de Certeau 1984: 186). 
As Ron Eyerman has argued, in his study of the coverage of the murder of Theo 
Van Gogh, occurences become events through narration and recitation, and
…through a dialectic of actions and interpretations. Actions occur in time and space, 
events unfold and take shape. An event unfolds and takes shape in the interplay 
between protagonists, interpreters, and audience, as sense and meaning is attributed 
and various interpretations compete with each other. As this meaning struggle proceeds 
various accounts stabilize, with perhaps one achieving some sort of hegemony, but 
counter interpretations or stories may continue to exist alongside. (2008: 22). 
The question this poses, particularly under the communicative conditions 
discussed, is what allows for the stabilization of such accounts? A key dimension 
of the process of stabilization is the ways in which mobile signifiers may be 
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projected onto ‘migrant’ populations in terms circulated from elsewhere: we don’t 
have these problems, yet, or, we have the same problems now. Yasmin Ibrahim, in 
discussing the targeting of Muslim populations in Europe, has termed this process 
disorientalism: the transnational circulation and appropriation of a ‘referential 
archive’ of associations and images that ‘creates an intertextuality that constantly 
weaves events as new memories crafting a new temporality to gauge and locate 
Islam.’ Thus:
Since 9/11 the narrative of Islam has put the focus on Muslim communities in the West. 
Unlike the Islamic revolution in Iran in the late 1970s and 1980s, this ‘reimagining’ of 
Islam, narrated as posing a clear and present danger to civilization, has placed Muslim 
communities in the West under relentless scrutiny. The Muslim intellectual debates and 
responses emanating from the communities are often seen as being externalised from 
the conditions of modernity or its incumbent reflexivity. The constant need to respond 
to events associated with Islam renders immense pressure on these communities to 
negotiate the sustained moral and social stigmatization in narrating Islam (Ibrahim, 
2007: 48)
The Irish burka debate was facilitated by the ‘call’ to debate future threats that 
can be assembled through an available archive of references, over and above the 
presence of agreed social referents. Further, and as Ibrahim suggests, these ‘calls’ 
have a performative dimension; the mediated debate unfolded, and was validated, 
when local ‘representatives’ were invited to ‘welcome the debate. This dynamic has 
been noted internationally: as a pan-European report conducted by the Institute 
for Race Relations (Fekete 2008) concluded, the circulation of international news 
in globalized public space is increasingly used to frame domestic discussions and 
political agendas, creating expectations that minority, and particularly Muslim, 
communities and community ‘representatives’ will respond, and respond in ways 
circumscribed as acceptably ‘moderate’ or ‘integrated’ (Fekete 2008: 14-16).
Conclusion: Debating Debate
A call for ‘debate’ is a call to concentrate communication power, power that overlaps 
significantly with socio-political and cultural power in any given public sphere. 
Under conditions of communicative abundance, the call for debate is a strategy 
for channeling attention through events that can muster a spike in coverage and 
controversy. It promises resolute action under conditions that both relativize the 
possibility of action, but that distract from its absence, until the next time. The 
recurrent, ritual attraction of ‘migration debates’ lies in the political capital they 
provide under the broad communicative and political conditions mapped in this 
article. However it would be too simplistic to read rituals as politically unproductive, 
or symbolic politics as socially and materially lacking in impact. A striking absence 
from the debates discussed here are those who are always the subject of debate, 
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subjectivized in debate, and arguably, subjugated through debate. The call for 
increased openness rarely focuses on this pronounced form of exclusion, and in 
so doing, underlines the political processes in play. In seeking to outline a tentative 
anatomy of migration debates, and in drawing on existing empirical research and 
theoretical clarification, this essay can be read as a working paper suggesting 
areas that require further, in-depth, contextual research. However it is also a study 
of how exclusion is effected not just in plain sight, but under the sign of openness 
and increased democratic participation. 
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